Ukraine Through the Eyes of Hugues Mingarelli

In this interview, Hugues discusses his role in signing the Association Agreement in 2014 (The 2014 Association Agreement was a treaty between the EU and Ukraine to establish political and economic ties, including a free trade area – ed.), the prospects of Ukraine joining the EU, the current political landscape in Europe, and the role of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the EU.

The conversation focuses on integration, international diplomacy, European perspectives on Ukraine, and the impact of significant international organisations during the war.

You have a long and distinguished career in diplomacy. During that time, you worked extensively on Ukraine, even before you became EU ambassador to the country. How did that experience shape your overall approach to international diplomacy?

The development in this country since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been very impressive. These developments have shown that when people have a strong will to change their country, they can do that. The Ukraine of 2024 has nothing to do with the Ukraine of 1991. The people of Ukraine have managed to change their country for the better and have gradually introduced democracy. They have made much progress in the rule of law, even if there is still a long way to go. They have been able to modernise their economic structures. They have also been able to forge solid partnerships with many foreign countries and international organisations. Therefore, I have been very impressed by what I have seen in this country over the last 30 years.

You arrived here in 1992, shortly after Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Were you hoping for such a relatively rapid change?

No, no. It was difficult to imagine that Ukraine, especially the people, could have changed that way. When I look at the young people around, it’s unbelievable to think that 30 years ago, their parents were Soviet citizens. It’s another culture, another mentality, another behaviour. It’s a different country and different people.

What is a difference in mentality that you’ve noticed?

It’s clear that there is a sense of responsibility today in Ukraine. People understand that they have their fate in their own hands. If one looks, for instance, at the strength of civil society, this shows that Ukrainians believe, and they are correct, that they have a key role to play in transforming their country. This is something that did not exist under the Soviet Union.

What was the approach at the beginning of Ukraine’s independence from the European Union?

For 30 years, Ukrainians have been told that they would never join the EU. And only in June 2022, four months after the Russian full-scale invasion, the EU decided to grant your country a new membership perspective. When Ukraine became independent, the main issues at stake were to promote some kind of political transition, to introduce gradual democracy, and to modernise the economic structures. However, the ambitions of your first leaders in the early 90s were limited.

In your opinion, as somebody who was involved in the negotiations when Ukraine signed an Association Agreement in 2014, what were the key challenges then?

This Association Agreement (The 2014 Association Agreement was a treaty between the EU and Ukraine to establish political and economic ties, including a free trade area – ed.) is the most applied EU bilateral agreement with partner countries, with three main components. The first is a political dialogue under which we discuss the developments in domestic politics and regional conflicts. The second one, which is the most important, is trade and economic cooperation. The third is a partnership in many sectors of the country’s political and economic life. The most crucial element is the deep and comprehensive free trade area, which has been set under the Association Agreement. The main objective of the deep and comprehensive free trade area is to promote regulatory convergence to progressively remove non-tariff barriers to trade so that the Ukrainian economy can gradually be integrated into the EU single market.

We also see inevitable tensions regarding trade between Ukraine and other EU countries. Indeed, this will become a crucial part of our negotiations on entering the European Union. How do you see Ukraine mitigating this situation?

Several temporary provisions will be necessary in some sensitive sectors. Extreme care and transitional periods will be required for agricultural or steel products because Ukraine is a significant exporter. In the EU, many people fear the impact of Ukraine’s entrance into the EU single market. But we can find a solution to this kind of difficulty without any doubt.

The population is somewhat insecure or scared about the prospects of Ukraine entering the EU. Are there real consequences, and how do you think Ukraine can find that compromise?

It’s clear that when Ukraine joins the EU, it will impact the EU budget, several key EU policies, and the EU decision-making process. First of all, it will be necessary to find a way to increase the budgetary resources of the EU, but this, in any case, is necessary irrespective of Ukraine. Even today, increasing the EU’s resources or moving ahead towards joint borrowing is essential. So, it’s not something that is due to Ukraine. It is necessary to adjust the agricultural and cohesion policies because Ukraine will get a lot of funds from these two policies. What we have to keep in mind is that Ukraine will very soon become an asset to the European Union. Not a liability but an asset. Ukraine has exceptional potential in agriculture, industry, information technology, tourism, and many other areas, yet the discussion increasingly centres around security and defence, which are becoming important in the EU. Ukraine will undoubtedly be the pillar of the EU defence structure on its eastern flank. Therefore, Ukraine will very soon be a net contributor to the EU.

We know that the EUis not a monolith. There are different countries with different political stances, plans, and goals. Some have radically different views on Ukraine, even during the war. How would you describe the political landscape in Europe?

People in the European Union have very different histories. Countries in Central Europe have a different perception of threats than countries in Western Europe. Countries such as Poland, the three Baltic states, Sweden, and Denmark perceive Russia and have been perceiving the Putin regime as a threat for 25 years. In Western Europe, most political classes, think tankers and diplomats perceived the Putin regime as our strategic partner with whom we should build the new European security architecture. Needless to tell you, who was wrong and who was right. So, this absence of a common strategic culture has a lot of implications for the EU’s foreign policy and security policy. We can see that some EU member states are trying to block any new EU initiative regarding Ukraine. Still, you can see that as well regarding Gaza and the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The EU needs help to forge a common position. We may have to wait for a few generations before we can have a common strategic culture between the 27 member states in the EU.

Entering the EU also involves adjusting many internal processes and political systems. What changes does Ukraine need to implement before or after entering the EU?

There is a need to strengthen and accelerate the democratic process. Ukraine has progressed much since 2014, but can still do better. In the fight against corruption and money laundering, many things have to be done. Strengthening public administration to advance with a good decentralisation process will be necessary. When it comes to the rule of law, the reform of the judiciary is very important.

What are some concrete steps to take, especially during the war, to strengthen the democratic process?

Ensuring that the parliament plays an important role. During the war, it’s better to have some kind of political unity in the country. The local authorities at the regional and city level have to be associated with many decisions regarding, for instance, the reconstruction or EU accession processes.

You have previously mentioned that Ukraine could follow a similar path to Baltic countries when entering the EU. Please describe this path.

In Western Europe, many people say that the Western Balkan countries made limited progress in moving towards the EU in 20 years. Because the Western Balkan countries got an EU membership perspective at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003 (a meeting of EU leaders that confirmed the future membership of Western Balkan countries in the European Union – ed.). And when you look at their situation today, they could have made much progress. Some people say if it took 20 years for the Balkan countries to close three chapters out of 33, it would take decades for Ukraine. But you cannot compare because you have three elements that determine the pace of the accession process. The political will of the country’s leadership, the capacity of the public administration, and the state of public opinion.

Ukraine is far more advanced than any other candidate country in these three areas. Since 2004, most people in this country have said, “We want to live in the kind of society that exists in Western Europe — an open society with a social market economy.” I don’t know many current candidate countries in which you have this determination of the people’s public opinion. Under the leadership of Yushchenko, Poroshenko, and Zelenskyy, it was clear that Ukraine wanted to join the EU and NATO.

President of Ukraine from 2005 to 2010, is best known for leading the 2004 Orange Revolution against election fraud and Russian influence. Despite an assassination attempt by poisoning, he pushed for stronger ties with the EU and NATO, facing significant challenges throughout his presidency.

We also have a question of the current war. Will the European Union and Europe wait for a peace agreement and settlement before allowing Ukraine to join?

I cannot tell you what will happen, but I think it would be a mistake to condition Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO on achieving peace and a settlement. If we make that a condition, you can be certain that the Putin regime will guarantee there is no settlement or peace. They will maintain a so-called frozen conflict, de facto a low-intensity conflict, to prevent Ukraine from joining. Therefore, peace should not be a condition for Ukraine’s membership in the EU or NATO.

You discussed the need for immediate post-war reconstruction and how that is crucial for Ukraine’s future. Why are many countries hesitant to proceed with that process?

The Ukrainians have already started the rebuilding because if you want to keep people in areas that are under constant Russian shelling it is necessary to ensure that the people can benefit from essential services. Therefore, you have to repair the energy infrastructure, which the Russians are constantly destroying. You have to ensure the population has water, medical services, and schools. Then there is the question of clearing mines. It is necessary to start the reconstruction process without waiting for a ceasefire, and Ukrainians did that ,including the use of frozen Russian assets. About 300 billion euros of Russian central bank assets have been frozen in the West. Out of these 300 billion, you have about 200 billion frozen in the EU and Belgium.

For months, there has been debate between those advocating for using funds to compensate for the destruction in Ukraine caused by Russian forces and those, particularly from Germany and France, who argue against it. They believe using these funds could violate international law, destabilise financial markets, and negatively impact the euro. They have proposed using the windfall profits of these frozen assets and the interest generated by these immobilised assets. This means we will have between three and four billion per year to finance the transfer of weapons and reconstruction.

What possibilities do you see for military and defence cooperation between the EU and Ukraine?

The EU is trying to develop EU member states to strengthen cooperation with the Ukrainian weapons industry. Several European companies, like Rheinmetall, have planned significant investments. The current bilateral security agreement between the EU and Ukraine (an agreement designed to enhance military cooperation and integrate Ukraine’s defence industry with the EU’s defence framework – ed.), which is under negotiation, foresees that there will be strong cooperation between the military industries of Ukraine and the EU. The EU adopted a new strategy for its defence industry a few months ago, and Ukraine is indicated as a member of the EU defence industry, so we are moving in the right direction.

What limitations do you see in the European policy of military support to Ukraine, and how can they be addressed?

I believe that we should provide more weapons to Ukraine, and we should be quicker without any doubt because the Ukrainians pay with their lives, our delays, and our hesitations. We should not show any fear of an escalation or the Russian nuclear threats. We should give Ukraine all the equipment, instruments, and tools they need to defend their country. We should provide Ukraine with more long-range missiles, and with the longer-awaited F-16 fighter jets (this interview was carried out before Ukraine received the first F-16s – ed.). We should also allow Ukraine to strike Russian military bases and equipment on Russian territory.

What would you say to the proponents of a de-escalation policy? You said we should not hear about escalation, but many politicians fear crossing certain red lines.

I don’t think that we should have any red lines. It should be up to the Ukrainians, first of all, to decide when they want to negotiate and on which terms because the fate of their country is at stake, and their lives are in danger, not ours. So it’s up to the Ukrainians to decide, and we should do everything possible to avoid negotiations under Russian terms. This would be a victory for the criminal regime, who chose to aggress without any reason, to kill thousands of people, and to devastate the country as they are doing. And it would be a way to embolden the bully. And you can be sure that Putin would not stop in Ukraine. He would quickly move to Moldova, Georgia, and probably try to destabilise some Baltic states. Therefore, we should be extremely firm and provide Ukraine with all the tools and equipment they need to repel the Russian aggression.

How would you explain to an average European citizen, who might be concerned about personal economic and political issues while seeing billions of euros sent to Ukraine, the importance of this support? What should the communication strategy inside the EU be?

We should explain to all EU citizens that this war is not just a Ukrainian war. It is our war as well. The Putin regime is attacking the international order based on a number of key principles enshrined in the UN Charter.

How do you assess the current role of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the EU, especially before the upcoming elections?

The Russians are extremely effective in manipulating information — far more effective than anybody in the EU. They have imposed their narrative portraying the Maidan revolution as an American coup, and shaping perceptions of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Most citizens in Western Europe believe this narrative. Russia is extremely effective in its ideological battle, spreading disinformation and manipulating information. They have a lot of tools and instruments in Europe. They have proxies in the political classes, think tanks, everywhere. And this is not only since 2022. This has happened since the beginning of the Putin regime in the summer of 1999, when he became prime minister.

How do you think the EU can counteract Russian disinformation and psychological operations? Some argue that democracies will permanently lose to authoritarian regimes when it comes to the information war.

I’m not an expert in this area. I believe that it would be helpful if we spoke in Western Europe of the Putin regime as an autocratic regime. For more than 20 years, people in Western Europe have heard that the Putin regime was our strategic partner. It would be helpful if we could say, look, this is an autocratic regime. In Russia, all opponents or all people who had divergent views over the last 25 years have been either killed or jailed or have had to flee the country. Externally, Russia has also been trying to destabilise all neighbouring countries in this time. Belarus is under total Russian control, and efforts to destabilise Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are ongoing. Until recently, they managed to keep Armenia under full control. And we should be realistic about that and explain that when you face such a regime, you must be firm.

Here in Ukraine, we also have a lot of frustration with big international organisations such as the UN, International Committee of the Red Cross, and other security and world peace guarantees. What are your thoughts on their current role in the world?

There is a crisis of multilateralism. We in the EU, we believe multilateralism is crucial to preventing conflict and solving crises. However, multilateral organisations today face a deep crisis. The UN is a good example. In the Security Council, there is total paralysis, not only about Ukraine but also about Gaza now. Look at the World Trade Organization; they are the same. Most critical economic countries violate the basic rules governing trade partnerships today. There is a crisis of multilateralism, but multilateralism is very important. We must reform these multilateral organisations and find a way to make them more effective. Many of these multilateral organisations were created after the Second World War. And there is an over-representation of the Western countries. And it would be good if Africa, Latin America, and Asia were better represented in a multilateral organisation.

From 2011 to 2016, you were a managing director for North African region, the Middle East, covering the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran. Ukraine is also trying to strengthen its policy in some of those areas. Ukraine is opening many new embassies and consulates in Africa. What are key challenges for working in that area, and how could we strengthen those ties?

We must be very attentive to these countries, respectful of their values, and make them understand that a life in Sudan, Congo, or Libya is as important for us as a life in Europe. Some countries in Africa or Latin America consider us to have double standards in assessing war crimes. It’s clear that in some cases, we are highly flexible when some countries do not respect international law, while in others, we are very strong. We have to understand their history and core values better and make sure that we do not try to impose our views but consider their opinions on how the new international order should be shaped.

How do you assess Russia’s work there?

They are very effective because they have spread their influence in the Middle East, Syria, North Africa, and Libya. I am told now that they are influential in Tunisia as well. In the Sahel (a region in Africa between the Sahara Desert and the savannas, facing issues like drought, political instability and conflict – ed.), they have managed to kick the French out of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The same happened in the Central African Republic. They are very active in Sudan. So, there is no doubt that they try to impose their views through disinformation to a large extent. All this is documented in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa. And I don’t believe this is a good thing for the African people.

What should the EU do to prepare to be more resilient in that case? And what is currently being done?

We should not speculate about the outcome of the upcoming American elections. The EU should do everything possible to ensure its security. We must move towards sovereignty in the economic and military fields, irrespective of what happens in the US. We cannot rely on other countries to ensure or guarantee our security. Several countries in Central Europe were very much attached to the American umbrella, and this is not the right policy. We should do everything possible to gain autonomy in the security and economic fields. And we are starting to do that in the EU. There is an awakening and an effort to ensure financial security, autonomy, and sovereignty. We can use different terms to be less dependent on other countries in strategic sectors.

We’ve seen President Macron’s rhetoric change dramatically in that aspect. He is now talking about the possibility of sending French troops to train Ukrainian troops here in Ukraine and more about the importance of allowing Ukraine to strike territory inside Russia. What do you think prompted him to change his approach, if you think it changed?

It’s a positive development, without any doubt, but I have no explanation. France matters in the EU. In my view, the fact that we should form a coalition of instructors to train in Ukraine is positive feedback on the EU position.

Given the scale of Russia’s environmental impact through its attacks on Ukraine, how can we better draw attention to this issue?

We have to explain that the Russian aggressor is devastating a large part of Ukrainian territory. Many observers today estimated that about one-third of the territory of Ukraine is contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordinances. We know what the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam (on 6 June, 2023, Russia blew up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, causing severe flooding and an ecological and humanitarian catastrophe in the region – ed.) had as a consequence for the fauna and flora. Steel factories and thermal power plants are bombed and destroyed, with asbestos spreading everywhere in the region. Water is not pumped in the coal and iron mines, so it gradually gets contaminated. Therefore, we have to ensure that the preservation and restoration of the environment are in the right place in the reconstruction process. It is far less spectacular than rebuilding a bridge or a road, but it is far more critical for the health of the Ukrainians who live in these regions.

How do you think the EU and the international community can be involved in this ecological restoration?

They are involved. The EU has recently decided on a Ukrainian facility with 50 billion euros for the next four years, and part of this money will be dedicated to environmental devastation. Major international financial institutions and other donors will also care for the environment because everybody knows it’s a real disaster. It’s not just some collateral damage. It’s devastating for the country.

It seems that even after the Kakhovka Dam explosion, there was hesitation in naming the perpetrator of the crime.

The Russians immediately said that the Ukrainians were responsible for the dam’s destruction. Some people were not sure who was behind the destruction. The Russians are significantly and extremely effective in disinformation.

Where has Ukraine been effective, and where maybe less?

Here in Ukraine, you are effective because there are a lot of media outlets, like your media, which can inform Ukrainian citizens in the right way. Abroad, it’s far more difficult because the Russians had Sputnik and Russia Today, even if today they can no longer broadcast in the EU, but for decades they have been spreading disinformation. A few weeks ago, we heard that a media outlet based in Prague, Voice of Europe, run by Medvedchuk (Viktor Medvedchuk is a former pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessman who has faced charges of treason for his activities undermining Ukrainian sovereignty – ed.), was also spreading disinformation in the EU. They have a lot of a disinformation ecosystem. It will take time to counter this disinformation ecosystem.

What narratives have Ukraine put out since the beginning of the war? Like the story of David and Goliath. President Zelenskyy addressed different countries since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and found ways to connect with those countries. What do you think was the most successful?

Everybody in the EU is convinced that the Ukrainians have been heroic in their resistance. When the Russian troops entered Ukraine on 24 February, 2022, the majority of us were convinced that it would take just a few days for them to take over Kyiv. The defence by Ukrainians has been extraordinary. This has improved Ukraine’s image. There is no doubt that your political leadership has very strong communications capacity. They have been able to mobilise the attention of the Western world and attract solidarity. And you have millions of Ukrainians living in Western countries today. These people also contribute to changing the perception of Western Europe about Ukraine and Ukrainians.

What’s your favourite thing about Ukraine, and what’s your favourite place?

Ukraine is such a fantastic country that it will be difficult for me to tell you which place is better. I like Kharkiv a lot. The constructivist buildings in the centre of Kharkiv are exceptional. I also like some areas in Dnipro, such as near the Dnipro River. I was very impressed when I went to Zaporizhzhia. I love Odesa, Lviv. You have a beautiful country, and I could not single out one place.

And if you could say something to the people who have never been to Ukraine, what would you want them to understand about this country?

I would like them to understand that Ukrainian citizens share our core values and, therefore, belong to our family.